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BARBARIANS INSIDE THE GATE: PUBLIC CHOICE
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Paul B. Stephan I"
The use of public choice theory to analyze legal issues raises hackles.
To be sure, all applications of economics to law disturb some legal
theorists, but this branch of the dismal science seems especially upsetting. Perhaps lawyers, trained in the arts of reasoned deliberation, resent
a theory that purports to elucidate crass self-interest at the heart of the
lawmaking process and, so it seems, celebrates the presence of the barbarians that have breached the walls of civilization. Many in the academy can live with materialistic theories as long as they remain broad and
impersonal, driven by class and the like, but an analytic construct that
assumes that lawmakers either sell themselves to the highest bidder or
depart politics may be too much to bear.
Nevertheless, public choice theory can serve as a useful tool for exploring a variety of legal issues, including those raised by international
economic law. It purports to be a positive theory, attempting to give a
rigorous and predictive account of the world but not assigning any normative weight to its insights. If it succeeds in this task, we cannot
blame the theory because the world it describes does not always conform to our preferences.
To support my claim about the usefulness of this style of analysis, I
will first give a brief account of its assumptions, structure, and insights.
Next, I confront what might be called meta-arguments about public
choice theory: Even if it appears to correctly explain certain aspects of
legal decisionmaking, should we still disregard the theory? Finally, I
apply the theory to four problems that arise in international economic
law. These applications illustrate both the strengths and the limitations
of public choice analysis.

* © Paul B. Stephan, mI.Percy Brown, Jr. Professor of Law and Hunton &
Williams Research Professor, University of Virginia.
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I. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
Public choice theory seeks to apply certain insights derived from the
study of private economic behavior to collective action problems, including that form of concerted activity that constitutes government.' The
fundamental assumptions should be familiar to anyone who has encountered the application of economics to law: individuals seek to maximize
their well-being; for a wide range of persons across a great variety of
times and places, well-being can be understood as primarily the accumulation of material benefits rather than spiritual grace; and a process of
natural selection discourages arrangements that over time fail to serve
the purpose of maximizing well-being. These assumptions are far from
uncontroversial, much less self-evident, but for present purposes I will
concede their validity.
Much of the vocabulary, as well as the analytic constructs, of public
choice theory stems from the classical economic analysis of monopolistic
behavior. A brief review of this account should suffice to demonstrate
the link. Classical theory teaches that where scarce goods are rationed
through markets, the equilibrium price is determined by the extent of
consumer demand for the good, which declines as prices rise (a downward sloping demand curve), and the supply of the good, which increases in response to higher prices (an upward sloping supply curve). Producers are assumed to be unable to discriminate among customers in
terms of price, which means that all goods will be sold at the same
market price even if some producers value the good more highly than
that price reflects, and some producers less. For consumers that would
have paid more, the difference between their reservation price and the
market price is called consumer surplus. Similarly, the difference between a producer's reservation price and the market price is called producer surplus.

1. The classic studies include JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
(1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIvE ACTION: PU3LIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Economic Regulation,
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974). For a review of the literature directed at lawyers, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE-A CRmCAL INTRODUCTION 3-5 (1991) (outlining the issues in public
choice theory and the law); Symposium-Public Choice Theory and the Law, 74 VA.
L. REv. 167 (1987).
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If many producers are free to bring goods to market, supply will
increase until the cost of making the last good produced (marginal cost)
equals the return from the sale of that good (marginal return). But if
only one producer supplies the good, the same calculus produces a different result. A monopolist must evaluate any increase in production in
light of revenue lost due to lower prices received for its goods (lost
producer surplus). The single producer maximizes its profit at the point
where no further goods could be sold without its marginal cost (a combination of production cost plus lost producer surplus) exceeding the
price paid for that good. By definition, then, a monopolist will choose
to supply fewer goods and will enjoy higher prices than would competing producers. The increase in a producer's return over what it would
receive in a competitive market (where no restrictions on supply exist)
is called a monopoly rent. The metaphor suggests that the power to restrict supply can be seen as a kind of property interest from which a
return can be derived.
Although this analysis involves only a single producer, it suggests
generally that many producers could derive a benefit from withholding
goods from the market to prop up the price. If producers could act
cooperatively rather than competitively, they would restrict production to
maximize producer surplus and generate monopoly rents that they could
distribute among themselves. Formation of a cartel is the most obvious
form of producer cooperation: the cartel typically sets production quotas
for each member and monitors their behavior to ensure that no one
chisels.
Thus far, we have considered only a positive analysis. The conventional normative response to this account of monopolies is to determine
that society is worse off if monopolies and cartels are permitted, because
the benefits to producers from high prices, the monopoly rents, are less
than the cost to consumers caused by those producers (lost consumer
surplus, in the technical jargon). Positive analysis concludes that government efforts to restrict monopolies and cartels, to the extent they
increase market competition, will benefit consumers more than they will
harm producers. Normative analysis, particularly the branch of theory
known as welfare economics, claims that it is desirable for government
to take that step, because a world in which consumers derive benefits at
the expense of producers is a better place as long as the benefits to the
consumers are greater than the harm to the producers.
Public choice theory takes from classical theory the concept of rentseeking through restrictions on production, and uses it to account for
governmental behavior. If, under certain conditions, private actors may
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band together in cartels to restrain competition, then they may also
induce government to aid them in this endeavor. Government can impose licensing requirements and costly standards on the production process, ban outright activity that might compete with producers, or limit
access to inputs needed for production. If it responds to producer interests, it may take these action not to increase public welfare, but to
benefit producers to the detriment of consumers. In other words, government has the potential to serve as the instrument of rent-seeking, not
only as its scourge.
In a democratic society where lawmakers must face the electorate at
periodic intervals, why would politicians enact rules that serve the few
to the detriment of the many? Obfuscation and misinformation might
prevent the general public from detecting immediately how it was being
disserved, but economic theory has as a key postulate that, over time,
suboptimal arrangements lose out to competition from superior ones. The
distinctive contribution of public choice theory is to provide a rejoinder.
It offers an account as to how, within the confines of a representative
democracy, lawmakers may enact rent-seeking rules.
At its heart, public choice theory proposes an inversion of the famous
Carolene Products concern for "discrete and insular" minorities.! Discrete and insular interest groups, it claims, can act collectively more
effectively than can the general public. Such a group can generate and
disseminate information among its members more efficiently, and generally can organize itself at a lower cost than can a similarly sized group
of persons with diverse interests. Unburdened by the difficulties of compromise and tradeoff, a single interest group can more easily form and
govern itself, and make its voice heard. Due to this organizational advantage, it can outcompete bigger but less efficient groups in the market
for political loyalty.
This grossly simplified account of what really is a quite elegant theory is sufficient to identify several of the underlying assumptions that are
necessary to make it work. First, politics must consist primarily of the
effecting of tradeoffs and compromises among competing interests, rather
than a solidaristic pursuit of an overarching common goal to the exclusion of opposing claims. In other words, lawmaking reflects the sum of
private interests, not some general religious or moral claim that supersedes private welfare maximization. Second, there must be a political
marketplace, in the sense that lawmakers have influence on the lawmaking process to the extent that they remain lawmakers, (i.e., are reelect2. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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ed), and that reelection requires responsiveness to constituencies. Third,
information must matter and be relatively costly to produce: in an electoral system where all votes have equal weight, a minority can
outcompete a majority only if voters have incomplete information on
which to base their votes, and if the minority can disseminate informa"tion conducive to its preferences more effectively than can the majority.
The next section analyzes each of these controversial assumptions.
To appreciate both the strength and the ambivalence of public choice
theory, one must take into account a complementary economic explanation of government action. Were minorities unable to outcompete majorities in the market for laws, then public choices, economic theory holds,
would tend over time to favor actions that improve the net welfare of
society (again, this is a predictive outcome of positive theory, not to be
confused with the normative claim that law should pursue this end). In
this scenario, government regulation would survive in the political marketplace only to the extent that it enhanced net welfare, i.e., if it addressed a problem of market failure. There is at least one instance, previously mentioned, where this condition may be satisfied, namely where
lawmakers enact rules that suppress monopolistic behavior. Another
would be where government provides for public goods
Public goods are commodities or services that: 1) are nonexclusive, in
the sense that consumption of such a good by one person does not
preclude another from enjoying the same good, and 2) are free, in the
sense that the cost of denying someone access to the good is greater
than the value of the good.4 Economists cite national security, a deliberative political and legal culture, and clean air and highways as examples
of nonexclusive and free goods. These characteristics explain why pri-

See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF TiE STATE (1989).
I do not mean to suggest that the suppression of monopolies and the production of public goods are the only justifications for government regulation that economic theory entertains. Regulation is also beneficial (i.e., conducive to net welfare en3.

hancement) if it corrects information asymmetries or the overproduction of goods that

generate negative externalities, i.e., costs to society for which the producer does not
have to account. The occasions on which economists believe that private markets fail
to generate the economically efficient level of goods are described as market failures,
and regulation has the best chance of improving social welfare in those cases where

market failure exists.
4. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. EcoN.
& STAT. 387, 390-92 (1954); see also DiagrammaticExposition of a Theory of Public
Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350, 362-66 (1955); Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332 (1958).
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vate producers will supply less of such goods than the members of
society would like to buy. Public goods cannot easily be converted into
property interests, which means that their producers will get no return
for some substantial portion of the benefit produced. But government, if
it responds to general net welfare, will produce the "right" (i.e., economically efficient) amount of public goods.
The importance of the public goods story is that it often provides a
competing hypothesis for government actions that public choice theory
would characterize as rent-seeking. Many instances of government-imposed regulation might be justified as an effort to provide a public
good, although they also may have as an effect a reduction in competition among producers of other private goods. There are no a priori
grounds for determining which explanation best fits any given regulation; characterization usually involves constructing a contestable narrative
as to what happened and what mattered. The dualism of public goods
and public choice accounts means, on the one hand, that proponents of
public choice theory (which purports to describe and predict government
actions without passing judgment on them) must confront the public
goods explanation and provide convincing reasons why that alternative
analysis does not adequately account for the measures taken, and, on the
other hand, critics of public choice theory must be prepared to justify
the anticompetitive effects of particular regulatory measures associated
with the provision of public goods.
II. METATHEORETICAL CONCERNS
The conventional progression in proposing a positive theory of social
interaction is first to describe the hypothesis and then to test it with
applications. But the use of public choice theory as an explanation for
lawmaking, and especially as an account of the construction of international law, is sufficiently controversial to merit another layer of argument. A critic of public choice theory may conceive of a number of
objections that precede the theory, principally by refusing to grant the
assumptions about human behavior on which it rests. This section attempts to anticipate and respond to several such objections.
First and most fundamental is the nagging problem of rationality. I
will not reproduce here the extensive debate over the possibility of
human interaction being based on rational choices. At its most abstract
level, that debate is perplexing and unsatisfying. On the one hand, there
are good reasons to handle the concept of rationality with caution: at
least since Goddel proposed his eponymous theorem, there has been
good reason to believe that mathematics, supposedly the purest ex-
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pression of human reason, rests at bottom on begged questions rather
than on logical proof On the other hand, theories of social life that
rule out the possibility of learned cooperative behavior and that see human interaction as grounded only in violence or the threat of violence,
perhaps supplemented by certain "hard-wired" behaviors and exogenous
environmental influences, seem seriously incomplete: complex social
structures do evolve and sustain the increasingly differentiated and interdependent behaviors of an ever-growing number of people. Because it is
important to postulate some kind of medium through which individuals
perceive and respond to social conditions, there is no harm in calling
that medium "rationality" as long as one exercises caution when attempting to specify its content. 6
The more pressing problem for internationalists is to come up with a
concept of rationality that accommodates interchanges between persons
from different cultures. It is all good and well to assert that individuals
seek to maximize their welfare, but what behaviors achieve that end,
and therefore receive positive reinforcement, will vary among cultures.
Persons with different backgrounds-linguistic, historical, class, gender,
erotic, or other cultural determinants-will carry with them different
intuitions and understandings of what makes sense. When these people
interact, they either will be doomed to misunderstanding, or they will
learn new conceptions of rationality that take into account the other's
different characteristics. If an internationalist is to use the concept, then
special care must be taken to avoid culture-bound conceptions of rationality.
On reflection, however, the problem of shared rationality does not
seem insoluble.7 First, a great deal of international interaction involves
persons from fundamentally similar cultures, especially those of Western
UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS IN PRINCIPLE
5. K. GOfDEL, ON FOnI
MATHmmTIC AND RELATED SYSTEMS 37, 57-63 (B. Meltzer trans., 1962). At least
that is one interpretation of the theorem's implications. The theorem itself deals only

with the possibility of establishing the logical foundations of the real number system.
6. At an existential level, it seems especially difficult for academics who spend

their professional lives teaching and writing to assert that learned cooperation cannot
take place. Perhaps this is why older academics, such as myself, who have invested a

larger portion of their lives in these behaviors, find it especially easy to resist the
notion that they are pointless.
7. Whether the solution is normatively desirable is another matter. Some rationalities may be objectionable because they exclude the point of view of minorities or
otherwise reflect bad characteristics. I am not attempting to provide a normative de-

fense of rationality, but only to defend the proposition that the concept may be used
in the construction of a positive theory.
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Europe and Anglophone North America and Oceania. Although it would
be foolish to assume any superiority derived from participation in a
Eurocentric culture, it would be just as silly to deny the volume and
significance of international interaction within this sphere. Second, in
many cases, learning between different cultures takes place relatively
quickly, even if in an unbalanced fashion. It may be significantly easier
for persons in one culture to fathom and attempt to internalize the
other's conception of rationality, rather than to convert the other to its
conception or to construct a polyglot rationality. Interactions between
multitudinous and small cultures probably follow this pattern: as a normative matter one might deplore this decrease in the world's diversity,
but as a positive matter, such transformations of small cultures surely
take place. Accordingly, there is reason to doubt whether unbridgeable
chasms between cultures, and therefore breakdowns in shared rationality,'
are frequent and prolonged.8
Another fundamental objection to public choice theory stems from its
focus on material well-being. Although, as economic analysis posits, the
welfare that individuals seek to maximize need not be material, a positive theory with claims to predictive power must relate to some kind of
objective behavior. Perhaps more out of the need to justify its existence
than anything else, economic science assumes that the desire to accumulate tangible goods and services drives social interactions. Yet, there is
every reason to believe that ideas matter, both in general and especially
in the political realm. Public choice theory seems seriously incomplete
to the extent that it denies the impact of ideas on politics.
Here, it seems appropriate not to deny the validity of the objection
but to limit its effect. Public choice theory does not purport to provide a
comprehensive explanation of all political arrangements. Rather, it identifies some factors that may have an impact on lawmaking. To the extent
observed behavior conforms to its predictions, the theory has its uses;
where the data refuses to behave, we can determine its limits. Unless a
critic is willing to claim that only ideas matter and that material conditions have no impact on human behavior, he must concede that the issue

8. Nor should an internationalist be concerned exclusively with universal principles. For example, the Kantian notion of international law as something largely confined to interactions among democratic countries has enjoyed something of a revival
in recent years, in spite of its explicit marginalization of relations among nondemocratic states. See Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907 (1992).
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is one of relative importance and not irrelevance. Observations can test
the extent of the impact of material conditions.
There is also a subtle sociological point lurking behind this objection.
For the same reason that academics prefer to assume that rationality
exists, they resist explanations of human behavior that deny the importance of ideas. The capacity to form and communicate ideas seems far
more differentiated across the general population than does the capacity
for physical appetites, and academics like to believe (and are selected on
the basis of the belief) that their intellectual capacity is superior to that
of the masses. There is something disturbingly egalitarian about a theory
that marginalizes this capacity My point is not that an argument is
false simply because it serves the self-interest of the person making it; I
accept rationality even though it is self-interested for me to do so. Rather, the presence of self-interest invites skepticism and suggests that the
proponent of a self-interested argument should submit the proposition to
whatever objective tests might be contrived.
A third objection to public choice theory draws on normative rather
than positive arguments. Even if one can demonstrate that legislators
respond to interest groups in ways that are consistent with public choice
theory, should we advertise that fact? Accounts of rent-seeking could
have at least two pernicious effects: they might educate rent-seekers as
to how to manipulate the lawmaking process more effectively, and by
presenting this phenomenon as a rational response to certain institutional
conditions, they may implicitly legitimate it. Lurking behind the latter
concern is the important and deeply controversial issue of whether it is
possible to talk of a truly positive theory within a value-free social science, or if instead all propositions in social science either legitimate or
subvert the status quo. If the latter, one must ask if it is then necessary
to defend the normative implications of every positive claim.
These are deep waters and I will not dwell in them for too long. As I
have stated, one can reduce these questions to a single issue of transparency, which in turn rests on one's conception of rationality."0 Transparency, and the liberal political theory on which it draws, requires a
conviction that knowledge can set us free. If a given social convention
or behavior is good, we should study it so that we can propagate whatever it is about that phenomenon that makes it good. If a social institu-

9. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE
LJ. 472 (1980) (discussing egalitarian predicates of economic analysis).
10. Paul B. Stephan, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L
REv. 1357, 1364-66 (1984).
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tion is bad, we must study it so that we can learn how to dispose of it.
Such faith in the uninhibited pursuit of critical inquiry can be challenged on many fronts, but it serves as a common ground for much that
constitutes contemporary legal scholarship, whatever its political orientation.
What this means in practice is that public choice theory can be put to
a range of political uses. On one level, it subverts the conventional faith
in democratic decisionmaking and the present institutional arrangements
that rest on law (including private ownership of the means of production) by suggesting why freely elected representative governments may
disserve their electorates. On another, it serves the status quo by providing a critique of law-based efforts to interfere with existing contractual and property arrangements. Dressed up as a fully developed social
science, it may promote the interests of technocrats at the expense of
politicians, for example, by smoothing the road for an ideology of liberal trade that frustrates the efforts of local elites to pursue diverse cultural and social goals. A skillful user of the theory can reverse each of
these tendencies.
IlI. APPLICATIONS
That public choice theory can enrich our understanding of international economic law should come as no surprise. The field developed in
part to provide an explanation for various international phenomena,
including the distribution of costs within the NATO alliance and the
resilience of protectionism in international trade. I have chosen four
problems that have not received as exhaustive treatment from users of
the analysis, but that nonetheless reveal new facets and hues when subjected to the public choice treatment. In each case, public choice theory
does not compel any particular conclusion about the optimal outcome,
but rather expands the range of inquiry one may undertake when exploring difficult issues of international economic law.
A. ExEcuTIVE POWER
To what extent may the President of the United States act on his own
initiative in the field of international economic relations, and to what
extent must his action meet with the approval of Congress? The unusual
structure of the United States government, which liberates the Executive
from the kind of accountability characteristic of parliamentary systems
and which permits voters to elect persons from different parties to head
the Executive and Congress, makes these questions almost uniquely
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important. The problem is fundamental and involves both constitutional
interpretation and strategies for statutory interpretation.
As a general matter one might take any of four approaches:"
(1)
Presidential Exclusivity. This position maintains that in the
field of international relations, the executive power is exclusive and not
subject to legislative interference, excepting only those explicit constitutional commitments (the authority of the Senate to consent to treaties,
the protection of individual liberties through the Bill of Rights, etc.) that
generally circumscribe the President's powers. This position would require a court to interpret statutes in a manner that would avoid conflicts
with presidential actions, and to invalidate a statute where such a conflict is unavoidable. The rhetoric, although not the holdings, of a number of famous Supreme Court decisions from the 1930s and 1940s is
consistent with this position.'
(2)

Preference for Executive Power. This approach posits that a

strong presumption exists in favor of executive power but disfavors
complete autonomy. Accordingly, it would permit the President to exercise this power without statutory authority but require deference tb Congress where it chooses to act. Consistent with this approach, a court also
would interpret statutes so as not to interfere with the power of the
President to conduct international economic relations, but would honor
the indisputable commands of Congress. Several important Supreme
Court decisions from the last decade or so express this position. 3
(3)

Preference for Legislative Power. To the contrary, this ap-

proach argues that to respect properly the power of Congress to enact
laws, courts should insist that every act of the Executive, to have legal
effect, rest on some sort of legislative authorization. This position rejects
all notions of inherent executive power and does not sanction presidential acts that depended only on the passive acquiescence of Congress for
their authority. Taking this approach, courts would always search for
some legislative basis for a presidential action, although they might tolerate generous interpretations of ambiguous statutes to uphold particular
exercises of executive power. A number of Supreme Court decisions are
consistent with this approach, in the sense that they engage in far-reach-

11. See PAUL B. STEPHAN El AL., INTERNATIONAL BusINEss AND ECONOmtIcs-LAw AND POLICY 111-13 (1993); Paul B. Stephan, International Lm in the
Supreme Court, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 150-54.
12. E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936);
Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948).
13. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675-688 (1981).
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ing, sometimes heroic quests for statutory authority before upholding
executive action."
(4)
Legislative Exclusivity. The strongest position in support of
legislative prerogatives would require courts to refuse to enforce any
action of the Executive that does not rest on precise, direct, and explicit
statutory authority. That an action might involve international affairs and
the ability of the Executive to bargain effectively with other governments would not matter to proponents of this approach. These persons
would regard the paramount obligation of courts to be the protection of
the exclusive power of Congress to make law, no matter what the context or the impact on the international obligations of the United States.
Among the body of judicial decisions dealing with questions of international economic law, the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,5 probably best reflects the last strategy.
The trade measure at issue in that case, limiting the import of certain
kinds of Canadian potatoes, stemmed from an executive agreement between the United States and Canadian governments. A statute-the Agricultural Act of 1948' 6 -specified the procedure that the Executive had
to follow before it could introduce rules affecting the import of agricultural products, and the provisions at issue in Guy W. Capps had not
been subjected to that process. That statute failed to declare that the
specified procedure, involving proceedings before the Tariff Commission,
was the exclusive means for promulgating rules for agricultural imports,
but neither did it expressly authorize any alternatives. The Fourth Circuit
ruled that the failure to comply with the Agricultural Adjustment Act
procedure was fatal, even though the Trade Agreements Act of 1934,7
another less specific statute, seemed to give the Executive authority to
negotiate and implement trade agreements such as the one on which the
potato agreement was based.
What does public choice theory have to say about these approaches?
First, one might maintain that international lawmaking reflects contractu-

14. E.g., Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548,
559-560 (1976); United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 571-73
(C.C.P.A. 1975); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. United States, 468 F.2d 202, 206-08
(C.C.P.A. 1972). Cf Barclay's Bank P.L.C. v. Franchise Tax Bd. 114 S. Ct. 2268
(1994) (rejecting the ban on state use of the tax method for international transactions
that the Executive, but not Congress, had assented).
15. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
16. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 897, 62 Stat. 1247 (1948).
17. Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Act of Jun. 12, 1934, ch. 474, §1, 48 Stat.

943 (1934).
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al rather than legislative processes, and that this aspect makes international law less prone to interest group capture. A legislative majority
can enact rules that bind the entire polity, but (ignoring the possibility
of jus cogens) imposition of an international obligation requires the
consent of each subject to whom the obligation applies. Although one or
a few governments might fall prey to the influence of a single interest
group, it is less likely that the same group can prevail across a broad
coalition of countries." As a first proposition, then, public choice theory might support a claim that the procedural obstacles to promulgating
international law might be more relaxed than those governing the enactment of domestic legislation.
But this proposition does not resolve the matter, because the public
choice literature-or more precisely, those scholars who draw normative
conclusions from the theory and seek to design rules that may frustrate
interest-group legislation-supports the erection of various procedural
requirements for lawmaking with the intended effect of reducing the
supply of public regulation. A good example is the nondelegation doctrine, which these scholars defend because it supposedly deters Congress
from empowering administrative agencies in a manner conducive to
interest group capture. 9 Yet an interpretive approach that frees the Executive from strict adherence to statutory restraints constitutes a delegation of lawmaking power that carries with it no guarantee that executive
action will not pander to special interests to the detriment of the general
welfare.
One might try to resolve this dilemma by distinguishing between
executive actions based on international agreements and other exercises
of executive power in the field of international economic relations. The
trade measure at issue in Guy IV. Capps and the claims settlement procedure upheld in Dames & Moore fall into the first category, the oil
import fee involved in Algonquin SNG into the latter. One could argue

18. This argument ignores the possibility that proponents of international lawmaking, in particular technical experts the influential value of whose skills will grow in
the face of international lawmaking, constitute an interest group.
19. See Peter H. Aronson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CoRNELL
L. REv. 1 (1982). For other arguments in favor of interpretive strategies intended to
raise the cost of producing interest group legislation, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. CIm. L. REv. 533 (1983); Jonathon R. Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An
Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEo. L J.
1787 (1992).
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that where another government has agreed to reciprocal obligations, the
possibility that the executive action reflects interest group rent-seeking is
diminished. But where a measure constitutes the unilateral exercise of
executive power, the barriers to rent-seeking are too low.
On reflection, however, this distinction is both unworkable and inapposite. It is unworkable because distinguishing between agreement-based
and unilateral actions seems too difficult in the face of the many vague
and broadly worded agreements that affect the international economy.
Consider, for example, the oil import fee at issue in Algonquin SNG.
The United States levy was not the product of an international condominium to bolster the value of the dollar or break the OPEC cartel, but
it was structured (or so the United States maintained) so as to be consistent with United States obligations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). One therefore could argue that this unilateral
excise on oil imports was based on the GATT, an international agreement. After all, the GATT Contracting Parties could not have made the
various concessions embodied in that agreement without also reserving
the right to impose trade controls necessary to further essential objectives such as coping with balance-of-payments imbalances and protecting
national security. Yet this use of the "based upon" concept ends up
swallowing almost every possible exercise of authority affecting international economic relations, because most actions not directly in violation
of the nation's international obligations can fit within one or more rights
reserved under various international agreements.
The distinction is also inapposite because it presupposes that international cooperation takes place only within the framework of explicit
agreements. Yet the concept of patterned cooperation, epitomized by the
tit-for-tat game, has become commonplace in international relations
literature.' In many instances, formal agreements may be too costly to
conclude, in particular because domestic special interests may have
enough power to block their ratification. But countries can achieve similar results by taking unilateral actions that produce benefits only if other
countries behave cooperatively. The tit-for-tat strategy requires that the
first mover expose itself to the risks of defection, and then continue to
act cooperatively as long as its implicit partners do not defect. The
strategy also dictates that defection be met with a single act of retaliation, but not with complete abandonment of a pattern of cooperation. In
retrospect, many aspects of the United States-Soviet rivalry seem broadly

20. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
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consistent with the tit-for-tat game, and other examples from the realm
of economic relations can be cited. There exists no obvious reason why
cooperation of this sort would more likely reflect interest group rentseeking than cooperation based on express agreements. If anything, the
opposite seems more plausible.
Yet another postulate of public choice theory further muddies the
waters. It holds that, ceterus paribus, welfare-enhancing collective action
becomes more difficult to achieve as the number of consents required to
adopt the action increase. This conclusion is based on the likelihood of
an interest group's recruiting any one decisionmaker to vote against a
proposal that increases general welfare at the expense of that group goes
up with the number of decisionmakers involved in a choice. It follows
almost automatically that congressional approval of a benign action
could be more difficult to obtain approval than would executive branch
support, given the relatively unified command structure in the latter.
Any rule that requires the express approval of Congress before an executive action can take effect, then, will frustrate a substantial number of
desirable steps.
Where does all this leave us? Public choice theory does not dictate
the adoption of any particular rule governing presidential-legislative
relations, but it does allow persons who have particular normative preferences to pick more intelligently among the possible rules. Suppose, for
example, one preferred international rules, either because of a belief that
treaties and other forms of international cooperation should be encouraged or due to skepticism about individual national interests. Public
choice theory suggests that someone with this preference should support
rules (1) or (2) over rules (3) or (4), because the latter give greater
sway to interest-group vetoes. If one focused exclusively on welfare
maximization and the suppression of rent-seeking, then one should prefer
(2) or (3) to (1) or (4), because vesting exclusive rulemaking authority
in either branch of government lowers the cost of rent-seeking (one
branch is easier to capture than are two). If one believed that promiscuous approaches to statutory interpretation by the judiciary encourages
undesirable interest group influence by increasing the importance of
statutory histories and other subtexts that such groups may shape, then
one would avoid rule (3) in comparison to the other choices. That the
Supreme Court, more often than not, seems to favor rule (2)-accepting
some assertions of executive power in the international field that lack
statutory authorization, but preserving the power of Congress expressly
to block such actions-implies that the Court may share some or all of
these preferences.
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B. CURRENCY CONTROLS
In spite of the movement toward the lifting of exchange controls over
the last fifteen years, many national currencies remain subject to a wide
range of government restrictions on their use either as a means of current payment or as a medium for investment." The type of control varies significantly, but the underlying purpose of controls is to discourage
holders of the local currency from either buying foreign goods and
services (except for those approved by the government) or investing in
foreign projects. Although one might associate such controls with efforts
to manage a negative balance of payments, some countries with strongly
positive balances (the Soviet Union in the 1970s, the People's Republic
of China in the 1990s) have imposed pervasive controls while others
with negative balances (e.g., the United States in the 1980s and 1990s)
have had no significant limits on the use of their currency.
Why do governments restrict the power of residents to dispose of
local currency? In many cases, exchange controls bolster government
programs to manage the economy, especially those promoting import
substitution. Generally, they reflect partnerships between the government
and particular sectors of the private economy.' Such partnerships invite
abuse: many studies have documented instances of "government failure"
in which the bureaucracies that administer the programs and the businesses that participate in them collaborate in rent-seeking.' These studies do not justify a sweeping condemnation of all currency controls as
the product of special interest success in the lawmaking process, but
they do suggest that the presence of controls raises a presumption of
rent-seeking, subject to further evidence.

21.

See generally IMF, EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS

TIONS-ANNUAL REPORT (1994);
ECONOMIC

JAGDISH BHAGWATI,

DEVELOPMENT: ANATOMY

AND

AND EXCHANGE RESTRIC-

FOREIGN TRADE REGIMES AND

CONSEQUENCES OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS

(1978).
22. I am ignoring the function of exchange controls in command economies that
have little or no private sectors. In such states, which for the most part dispense with
effective institutions of representative democracy, exchange controls have served to
strengthen the power of the governing 61ite by enabling it to ration strictly who
would have access to foreign goods and services. For a more extensive discussion of
exchange controls in these economies, see STEPHAN, Er AL., supra note 11, at 224-27.
23. See generally Anne 0. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, 4 J.
ECON. PERSP. 9 (1990) (summarizing the literature that evidences public and private
abuses in developing nations' economies).
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This issue has legal significance because Article VIfl(2)(b) of the
treaty establishing the International Monetary Fund, 4 which most of the
countries of the world have ratified, obligates the parties not to enforce
exchange contracts that violate national exchange regulations that satisfy

IMF rules. A substantial body of case law and scholarly commentary
has wrestled with the meaning of this obligation. Perhaps the most divisive issue is what constitutes an "exchange contract." Some courts, especially the state and federal courts of New York, interpret the term narrowly so as to avoid enforcing the Article VIII(2)(b) obligation; many
scholars and a few courts in other jurisdictions disagree. So, for example, several New York courts have refused to treat letter of credit transactions as exchange contracts, even though the letters provided for payment in a foreign currency." Other cases similarly have refused to treat
foreign currency loans as coming within the Article VIII(2)(b) obligation.'
As in the case of maintaining the boundaries between executive and
congressional power, public choice theory does not dictate any particular
resolution of this interpretive issue, but it does suggest the results that
might flow from particular normative preferences. For someone who
objects to legal rules that derive from rent-seeking, most currency controls will seem suspect if not obnoxious. Such a person will seek an
interpretation of Article VII(2)(b) that will discourage governments from
imposing such controls. If that person further believes that a broad interpretation of this Article will not induce more countries to submit to
other forms of currency discipline-a plausible inference, given the importance of other benefits from IMF membership such as access to credit-then he would prefer to make the comity given foreign currency
controls as weak an obligation as possible. That person would welcome
the strategies adopted by the New York courts, which generally reduce
the scope of Article VIII(2)(b).
None of this is ineluctable. One might believe that rent-seeking is an
acceptable price to pay for active involvement of citizens in the lawmaking process. One could doubt whether many currency controls reflect
24. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IM). signed for
the United States Dec. 27, 1945, T.I.A.S. 1501, at 1362, 2 U.N.T.S. 40, 66.
25. J.Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda). 333 N.E.2d 168, cer.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co.,
190 N.E.2d 235, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964).
26. E.g., Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 442 N.E.2d
1195 (1982).
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rent-seeking, and assert that in most instances these controls respond to
market failures. One even could claim that the comity promised by
Article VIII(2)(b) has independent value and deserves strengthening,
because national governments ought to get into the habit of respecting
those choices that international law permits other governments to make.
What public choice theory contributes is a shift in the burden of argument by raising concerns that the holders of these beliefs must address.
C. TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The last few years have witnessed an upsurge in the popularity of the
claim that environmental goals conflict with the expansion of free trade.
The debate in the United States over the implementation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gave special urgency to this
argument, but the issue also has arisen within the context of the present
GATI structure and the forthcoming Uruguay Round commitments. In
particular, a GATT dispute resolution panel decision that condemned the
United States Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA),27 has served as
a lightning rod for those who believe that trade liberalization means the
sacrifice of environmental quality."8
The MMPA prohibits the import into the United States of tuna from
countries that do not satisfy United States standards for protecting dolphins in the course of fishing. Mexico contended that this statute constituted an impermissible quantitative restriction under GATT Article XI;
the United States justified its ban as a measure to protect natural resources permitted by GATT Article XX(b) and (g). A GAT panel
rejected the United States claim, contending that GATT parties may
limit imports only to protect natural resources within their own borders.
As of this writing, the GATT Contracting Parties have not adopted this
gloss as an acceptable interpretation of Article XX, and other aspects of
the panel report suggest that more narrow grounds exist for condemning
the MMPA.29 But whatever the legal standing of the panel report, it

27. United States Marine Mammal Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat.
1027, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1361-14212 (1988).
28. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GAIT,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
155 (39th Supp. 1993).
29. See David Parmeter, Environment and Trade: Much Ado About Little? 27 J.
WORLD TRADE 55 (June 1993). The MMPA allows imports from countries whose
tuna fishing fleets do not kill a higher proportion of dolphins than does the United
States fleet during the same year. As the panel observed, this exception is completely
arbitrary, inasmuch as a country will not know until the end of the year what per-
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has framed an issue about which commentators have generated much
controversy: Does the GATT, and more generally the principles of free
trade upon which a liberal international economic order supposedly rests,
permit countries to impose trade sanctions in response to environmentally harmful conduct, if that conduct does not directly injure the country
imposing the sanctions?"

This is a large topic and I wish to address only a small piece of it.
Some commentators would claim that stating the question as I just have

is misleading, because most environmental harms produce direct injuries
to all persons on the planet, even if the damage is intrinsic rather than

material.?3' It seems possible, however, to analyze the problem in terms
of three categories of environmental injury: harms that have direct effects in the country of importation (spillover pollution), harms to the so-

called global commons, and harms that affect only persons in the country of production. 2 The first and third categories seem less interesting,

the fast because the case for retaliation seems self-evident, and the third
because it represents a variation on the traditional problem of comparative advantage. But asking whether one country may employ trade mea-

sures to address another's exploitation of a global commons seems well
worthwhile.

The conventional analysis of commons problems notes that the absence of property rights leads to inefficient overconsumption and ulti-

mately the exhaustion of the resource; the typical instrumental response
is to recommend the creation of property rights 3 Some international
centage is acceptable. Id.
30. See e.g., DANIEL ESTY, GREENING THE GATr: TRADE, "ma ENvoIONmr,
AND THE FUTURE 17-18; CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENr LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds.,
1993); UNrrED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), THE GREENING OF
WORLD TRADE IssuEs (Kyn Robertson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992); Ted L

McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet
Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles. 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 477 (1991); Eliza Patterson, GATT and the Environment: Rules Changes to

Minimize Adverse Trade and Environmental Effects, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (June
1992); John H. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GAYT and the Legal Environment
for International Trade After the Uruguay Round, 14 U. ARK. LrnLE ROCK L.J. 429,
434 (1992).; Symposium-Environmental Quality and Free Trade: Interdependent Goals
or IrreconcilableConflict? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219 (1992); Howard F. Chang,

An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, U.S.C.
Law Center, Working Paper 94-98 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 30, at 39-43.
32. STEPHAN, Er AL., supra note 11, at 770-71.
33. See Abbott, supra note 20, at 396-98 (discussing the allocation of property in
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regimes have done this, notably the Montreal Protocol for the protection
of the ozone layer,34 but such structures take time to create and remain
subject to holdout problems. In the interim, either the commons must
suffer or individual nations must resort to unilateral measures to induce
cooperative protection of the resource.
Are trade sanctions, directed either against the offending product or
the country that tolerates overconsumption, justified when used for this
end? Public choice theory identifies several possible lines of analysis,
the validity of which turns on the empirical basis for their underlying
assumptions. Some economists have portrayed pollution (including
overconsumption of a commons) as a problem of negative externalities:
polluting producers capture the benefits embodied in the goods they
make but do not have to pay for the damage caused by their dirty production processes. If this scenario is correct, then polluters, at least
within certain industries, may constitute a discrete and insular group that
can outcompete the general public. They would use their organizational
superiority to deter lawmakers from enacting rules that would improve
overall welfare but increase their production costs. Seen in this light,
antipollution measures, including trade sanctions directed against foreign
polluters, might be seen as welfare enhancing. If one otherwise believed
that increasing the common wealth at the expense of a few polluters
would be normatively desirable, then one would embrace measures that
attack despoilers of a global commons.
Other economists, however, make a different set of empirical assumptions and reach a contrary conclusion. These persons argue that producers do not necessarily see environmental regulation as costly. Environmentally motivated rules may require new investment and otherwise
raise the cost of production, but under some conditions, established
producers might find these costs less onerous than would new entrants
into the industry. If designed with this end in mind, environmental regulation can serve as a barrier to competition, and the resulting monopoly
rents may outweigh the costs of compliance. At least some producers,
then, may have an incentive to seek environmental rules that would
harm the general welfare because the lost consumer surplus associated
with the producers' monopoly rents would outweigh the environmental
benefits. One possible source of allies for such producers would be a
society's economic and intellectual 61ites, who tend to prefer a cleaner

resolving common problems).
34. Montreal Protocol on the Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 23 I.L.M.
874 (1993).
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environment over economic expansion to a greater extent than does the
general public. Public choice theory would predict that producers seeking monopoly rents and better educated and more powerful 6lites could
obtain regulatory regimes that harmed overall welfare.
Which of these stories might explain trade sanctions? One important
area of empirical inquiry is the impact of sanctions on producer behavior. A ban on dirty imports, for example, denies the producer access to
one market but leaves it free to sell the product to other, less fastidious
customers. If the alternative international markets are sufficiently thick,
the producer's cost from lost sales in the regulated market may be minimal and the dirty production would continue pretty much as it had
before the trade sanction. Meanwhile, domestic producers would enjoy
the benefits of a protected market, which might outweigh the costs of
complying with the environmental regulation.
Reconsidering the environmental regime embodied in the MMPA, it
seems plausible to believe that the United States fleet might find it less
expensive to purchase the new technologies necessary to produce a
dolphin-safe catch than would some of their developing country competitors. The producers of these new technologies might be located in the
United States, creating yet another obvious interest group favoring rules
mandating the technologies' use. By contrast, those consumers of tuna
who might prefer lower prices to reassurance about the safety of dolphins are undoubtedly a diffuse and unorganized group, unable to discipline effectively lawmakers who might act against their preferences.
Were these assumptions correct, public choice theory would predict that
United States lawmakers might impose requirements on the tuna industry
that would result in a net welfare loss to society. Someone normatively
opposed to such a loss then might embrace an interpretation of the
GATT that made such rules more difficult to implement.
As with the other applications, public choice theory does not militate
for or against any particular policy. Rather, it sets a research agenda by
identifying the empirical issues that a critic might want to address before approving or condemning environmentally motivated trade restrictions. As such, it can be a useful tool, even though it cannot be an exclusive one.
D. PROTECTION OF CULTURE

-Culture is one of those things that define and enliven a society, even
if we have a hard time establishing exactly what it is. Across time and
place, many peoples have sought to assert and nourish their culture,
acting in the belief that every member of the society benefits from such
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investments. Language, art, and the other elements of culture, whether
high or low, appear to have the attributes of public goods, inasmuch as
one person's participation in a particular culture does not preclude
another's, and charging a fee for such participation seems impracticable.
Were government seeking to promote the general welfare, we would
expect to find many instances in which it pursued cultural goals.
At the same time, some persons benefit more from government actions regarding culture than do others. Foremost are the purveyors of
culture, whether educators, writers, or artists. We should expect these
persons, articulate and well connected as they tend to be, to constitute a
powerful lobby for government support of their activities. Thus, public
choice theory suggests that we also may encounter instances where governments take steps to promote culture that might diminish overall welfare.
Support for culture need not only take the form of subsidies and
commissions. One way in which a society might protect its cultural
heritage is through discouraging influences that threaten it. The state
might prohibit the sale of national cultural treasures or, as the French
government recently attempted, outlaw the assimilation of foreign phrases into the national language. International economic law comes into
play when a government seeks to ban imports that in some way harm
the national culture. Some of these rules seem silly and inconsequential
(the United States restrictions on the importation of propaganda comes
to mind), but others have significant economic consequences. Prominent
among the latter is the effort of the European Union to impose a quota
on the number of hours during which its television stations may broadcast non-European (principally United States) programs.35
Are such restrictions necessary components of a government effort to
protect a common culture from erosion, or do they frustrate consumer
preferences for foreign-originated entertainment to the narrow benefit of
domestic producers? Once again, public choice theory proposes a line of

35. Council Directive 89/552 of Oct. 3, 1989, Coordination of Certain Provisions
Laid Down by Law, Regulation, or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcast Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298); see Jon
Filibeck, Culture Quotas: The Trade Controversy over the European Community's
Broadcasting Directive, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 323 (1992); Timothy M. Lupinacci, The
Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in the European Community: Cultural
Preservation or Economic Protectionism? 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113 (1991);
Clint N. Smith, International Trade in Television Programming and the GAIT. An
Analysis of Why the European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & BUS. L. 97 (1993).
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inquiry, not a resolution to the above problem. At the outset, one needs
to address fundamental issues about the definition of culture, and in
particular the question of whether hierarchical norms, as opposed to
popular usage, contribute to the building of a culture. One would also
need to know something about the strength and extent of government
support of domestic cultural industries. Someone who favored popular
usage over hierarchical norms and who detected an established and
government-supported domestic industry might conclude that measures
such as the European Union's television programming rules constitute
welfare-reducing protectionism; those inclined toward a more authoritarian approach to culture might approve of these actions regardless of the
incidental benefits to domestic producers.
CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, public choice theory poses difficult problems for teachers and practitioners of international economic law. It
tends to undermine the logical appeal to implicit norms that often makes
up the heart of legal analysis, and it poses questions that require empirical responses. It suggests that appetites more than ideals might dominate
the lawmaking process, a conclusion that is at least dreary if not disillusioning. It also suggests that not all international norms are alike, and
that some may deserve to be distinguished away rather than enthusiastically applied.
Yet I have trouble seeing how a scholar could hope to understand
international economic law without coming to grips with this theory. So
much of what it suggests about lawmaking seems apposite, and so many
problems in the field seem to become clearer and more interesting when
subjected to its analytics, that I cannot imagine in a world in which no
one raised the questions that public choice theory asks. Nor do I regard
the theory as committing its student to any particular set of normative
preferences or political ideologies. What I do see the theory achieving is
empowerment: its users can understand better what the instrumental
effects of their preferences may be and shape their arguments accordingly. This is no small feat.

